Confidential · internal / advisor use only · do not forward to seller side
Investment Memo · Iowa City, Iowa

Chauncey & Plaza Towers bulk acquisition: open $14.0M, walk at $15.1M.

Prepared for Roby Miller Seller GreenState Credit Union Date July 2, 2026 Model independently replicated & verified

The deal works, but not at the model's numbers. The workbook's math is clean — every output verified to the dollar, zero formula errors — but the $15.99M ceiling only clears the 18% hurdle because Chauncey's excess return subsidizes a Plaza price that fails the hurdle on its own.

Three corrections drive the recommendation: Plaza is worth ~$5.0M, not $5.83M; true peak equity is ~$11.2M, not $6.0M; and the workbook has a wiring flaw that will corrupt the next scenario run.

$14.0M
Opening bid · −39.6% to included ask
$15.1M
Walk-away ceiling · −34.9% to ask
~24%
Base unlevered IRR at recommended ceiling
$11.5M+
Equity to actually budget (peak, month 13)

The price spectrumWhere every number sits

Included seller ask to recommended open — one scale, all positions.

At $14.0M the bear case still returns 12.7% unlevered and the base returns 28% — a genuinely asymmetric entry. At $15.99M the bear drops to 8.7% and leverage adds nothing (debt at 7.25% against an 8.7% asset is pure risk). The ~$900K gap between the model ceiling and the recommended one is entirely the Plaza allocation.

Section 01 · Model auditWhat was verified, what was found

The entire 60-month engine was rebuilt independently and matched the workbook exactly: $17.18M max offer, 21.8% / 27.5% IRRs, $51,088 stabilized monthly NOI. Confirmed clean:

Seven findings, ranked. Tap to expand.

F1Split-brain wiring — fix before any scenario work

Two parallel offer-case tabs exist. Inputs!B38 (the price) pulls from Current Offer Case, but the operating engine — Plaza unit count, rent, exit $/SF, and capex in Unit Pools D7/P7/T7/W7 and AI6:AI9 — still pulls from Revised Offer Case.

Values match today, so outputs are correct. But edit Plaza capex to $225K in Current Offer Case B11 and the price falls while the model keeps running $175K — lower price and artificially higher IRR. Changing Plaza rent in Current B13 does nothing at all; no formula references it.

Fix: repoint Unit Pools D7, P7, T7, W7 and AI6:AI9 to Current Offer Case. Also: Current B17 hardcodes HOA/tax/opex instead of referencing Inputs, and Current B20 lacks the MAX(0,…) guard Revised has.
F2Real equity need is ~$11.2M, not $6.0M

The dashboard's $6.02M is only the day-one check: 35% of price + closing costs + loan fee. Debt is sized on price only — no capex facility — so $4.59M of capex and ~$1.4M of pre-stabilization deficits (portfolio NOI is negative for the first ~5 months) come out of equity month by month.

Cumulative levered cash flow bottoms at −$11.24M in month 13 and doesn't turn positive until month 34. Budget $11.5M+ or negotiate a capex tranche into the loan. This is the most important correction for capital planning and any LP conversation.

F3The late-cycle drag credit double-counts

Offer Calc deducts $204K (4 months × stabilized NOI) for missing the August 1 cycle — but the operating model already starts at a December close with 10%/5% initial occupancy and 8–12 month lease-up. The weak first season is already in the cash flows. Keep the $204K as seller-facing ammunition; don't stack it as economics.

F4Plaza's exit-margin price ignores time — the core valuation error

The $5.83M Plaza price = net exit × (1 − 25%) − capex − 4 months' carry. No discounting — but the real cash flows are a 12-month hold, a 36-month sellout starting month 13, and four years of HOA/taxes on the tail.

Run through the actual monthly engine: Plaza standalone at $5.83M returns 13.8% unlevered — below the 18% hurdle — and 2.7% in the bear case. Chauncey standalone at $7.1M returns 36.0% base / 17.8% bear. The blended 21.8% is Chauncey carrying Plaza.

Plaza's standalone-clearing prices: $5.06M for 18% base; $3.46M to hold 12% in the bear.

F5Internal strategy inconsistency — and the comps cut against must-combine

The model rents Chauncey's 51 suites as-is at $1,690 and exits as-is at $475/SF with $12.5K/unit — while assuming Plaza's 56 physically similar suites are worthless until combined at $175K/converted unit. Both can't be right without a physical reason (kitchenettes?). Verify unit by unit.

The closed sales say the quiet part: 530 SF Plaza units (907, 1007) sold at $528 and $600/SF in 2021/2023, and the 43-sale downtown dataset shows small units (≤800 SF) at a $501/SF median. An as-is case ($1,550 rent, $420/SF exit, $15K/unit) returns ~29% standalone at $5.83M.

Position: underwrite the combine case, pay the combine price, and keep as-is viability as private option value — never seller's.
F6Plaza capex timing is optimistic; the $175K itself is unbid

All $3.92M of conversion capex is spent in months 1–4 while units earn rent from month 1. Combining 56 suites into ~22 units — demo, MEP re-stacks, kitchens, life-safety, HOA review, permits — is realistically 9–18 months with little rent during construction. Stretching the timing barely moves IRR but raises peak equity to ~$11.5M and pushes leasing into another off-cycle. The bigger risk: $175K/unit is a placeholder with no contractor bid behind it, and it swings ±3 IRR points at ±$50K.

F7Confirmed: 57 Plaza tax parcels vs. 56 seller-listed suites

The tax roll shows exactly 19 units per floor on levels 4–6 (401–419, 501–519, 601–619) = 57 parcels; seller pricing says 56. Units 405/505/605 carry materially lower tax bills — likely smaller units. Chauncey ties out at 51 (no x08 on level 5).

Also: a Chauncey Unit 400 commercial parcel ($37.1K/yr taxes) appears in no seller pricing row, and the 101-201 restaurant/bowling parcel appears in no tax roll. The commercial tax picture is incomplete. Resolve the Plaza schedule before PSA pricing.

Section 02 · SensitivityThis is an exit-and-capex deal, not a rent deal

Single-variable impact on unlevered IRR at the $15.99M ceiling (base = 21.8%). The $1,650 rent anchor everyone worries about costs ~0.5 points; a Chauncey capex surprise costs ~5. Diligence dollars belong in unit walks and a real Plaza conversion budget, not rent studies.

Chauncey capex → $50K/unitfrom $12.5K
−4.9 pts
Plaza capex → $225K/converted unitfrom $175K
−2.9 pts
Chauncey exit → $425/SFfrom $475
−2.8 pts
Chauncey sellout → 48 monthsfrom 30
−2.5 pts
Plaza exit → $400/SFfrom $440
−2.1 pts
Plaza sellout → 48 monthsfrom 36
−1.7 pts
Plaza rent → $2,250from $2,750
−0.5 pts
Chauncey rent → $1,500from $1,690
−0.5 pts
Chauncey occupancy → 85%from 93%
−0.3 pts
Downside / base / upside — unlevered · levered IRR by price
PriceBearBaseBull
$14.0M (recommended open)12.7% · 13.9%28.1% · 36.0%40.3% · 54.7%
$14.5M11.6% · 12.6%26.4% · 33.7%38.1% · 51.8%
$15.19M (model opening)10.2% · 10.8%24.2% · 30.8%35.3% · 48.0%
$15.99M (model ceiling)8.7% · 8.8%21.8% · 27.5%32.3% · 43.8%

Bear: Chauncey $1,500 / $425/SF / $25K capex / 48-mo sellout / 85% occ; Plaza $2,250 / $400/SF / $225K / 48-mo / 85% / 18-mo lease-up. Bull: Chauncey $1,900 / $525 / $12.5K / 24-mo / 95%; Plaza 28 converted units / $3,250 / $480 / $150K / 24-mo / 93%.

The walk-away anchor: a moderate-stress case (Plaza capex $225K + exit $420; Chauncey capex $20K + 42-month sellout; all else base) clears 18% unlevered at exactly $14.97M. Prices for 18% by scenario: bear $11.8M / base $17.4M / bull $20.7M. Price that holds 12% in the bear: $14.3M.
Financing sensitivity — base case, $15.99M
StructureLevered IRRPeak equity
65% LTV / 7.25% (model)27.5%$11.2M
70% / 7.25%28.4%$10.5M
65% / 8.50%26.9%$11.4M
55% / 7.25%26.0%$12.7M
50% / 8.50%25.0%$13.5M

Leverage is a modest return lever here because sales sweep the loan quickly; its real job is reducing peak equity. Two unmodeled items matter more than rate: partial-release pricing (a lender demanding 110–125% of allocated loan per release chokes the sellout engine — the model assumes a frictionless 100% sweep) and condo warrantability (single owner of 79+ units + hotel history + commercial concentration is an agency problem for the retail buyers' financing, which attacks the $440–475/SF exits directly).

Section 03 · Offer structureComponent by component

ComponentSeller askModelRecommended
Chauncey hotel — 51 suites
Cap validated: 36% standalone base, ~18% bear. Open $6.5M.
$9,690,000$7,100,000$7,100,000
Plaza hotel — 56 suites → ~22 units
$5.06M is the standalone 18%-clearing price. Open $4.5M.
$10,080,000$5,829,971$5,000,000
Plaza other resi + parking
Two of four anchor comps are foreclosures at the very ask; 15% off, not 10%.
$1,799,600$1,619,640$1,530,000
Chauncey 1007 / 1107
1007 is itself a foreclosure listing at $453/SF; 10% holds. Confirm availability.
$1,599,800$1,439,820$1,440,000
Commercial — all units
See Section 04.
$8,887,206$0$0
Total$23,169,400$15,989,431≈ $15,070,000

Why these two numbers. $15.1M only requires the base case to be roughly right; $15.99M requires it to be exactly right — and its two load-bearing assumptions ($175K Plaza capex, $440–475/SF exits) currently have no contractor bid or appraisal behind them.

Pair the price with structure: pre-closing leasing license (already in the January LOI — worth real money at a December close); seller pays HOA/taxes through closing off actual bills; earnest money stays refundable until the Plaza conversion budget and HOA consents are in hand; price adjusts per unit if the 56/57 schedule resolves against you.

Section 04 · CommercialHold the line at $0

The $8.89M of hard-to-price commercial carries brutal fixed costs the residential model never sees: the tax roll shows $241K/year across Chauncey 300/301/400/403, plus ~$167K/year HOA on the four Chauncey commercial rows — $400K+/year of carry before a dollar of TI, commission, or downtime.

The two shells (301, 403) at seller's $195/SF ask are worth their residual after $50–80/SF TI, 12–24 months' downtime, and commissions — plausibly $60–120/SF. The RSM office is worth its actual lease NOI at an 8.5–9.5% cap, which requires the rent roll you don't have.

If GreenState insists on bundling: (a) option, not purchase; (b) seller carry-back at 0–3% on the commercial tranche; or (c) a price credit equal to two years of commercial carry (~$800K) against the residential number. Never let commercial $/SF asks average into the residential price.

Section 05 · Gating diligenceRanked by dollar impact, not checklist convention

  1. Plaza conversion budget from a real GC±$50K/unit swings ±3 IRR points; the entire Plaza price rests on a placeholder. MEP re-stacks, plumbing/venting for kitchens, life-safety, ADA.
  2. Unit-by-unit Chauncey condition walk$12.5K/unit capex is the model's biggest hidden risk (−4.9 pts at $50K). 2019-vintage former hotel suites; verify FF&E and mechanicals.
  3. Condo documents — currently unreadThe three recorded declarations are image-only scans. Nobody has confirmed leasing rights, combination rights, kitchen/MEP modification rights, individual resale, or absence of a rental cap/hotel program. Any one can kill the Plaza thesis.
  4. Kitchen / kitchenette inventory, both buildingsDetermines whether Chauncey's as-is assumptions are safe and whether Plaza truly requires full combination (F5).
  5. Plaza legal unit schedule — 56 vs. 57Units 405/505/605 look anomalous on the tax roll.
  6. Lender term sheet with release provisionsPartial-release percentage, presale requirements, and whether a capex tranche is available (F2).
  7. Retail-buyer financing / warrantability opinionSingle-entity concentration + hotel history + commercial share vs. agency guidelines — this protects the exit $/SF, which is the deal.
  8. Identify the $1,650 listingsWhich units, which owner, furnished or not. ~0.5 IRR points economically; real money at the table.
  9. HOA financialsBudget, reserves, delinquencies, planned specials. GreenState likely controls both associations — get it in writing.
  10. September 2026 tax installmentConfirm the ×2 annualization and any pending assessment appeals.

Section 06 · Negotiation framingTheir carry is your leverage

GreenState is a credit union holding foreclosed inventory with $488K/year of taxes + HOA bleeding on the included pools alone — every quarter of delay costs them ~$120K plus reserve pressure. The script:

  1. Plaza cannot be priced as 56 finished units when the buyer must fund a ~$4M conversion and a four-year exit — the market itself is saying so through $1,650 rents and $449K foreclosure listings in their own building.
  2. A December close misses the entire academic leasing year — worth a price credit or the pre-closing leasing license, their choice.
  3. The commercial book needs its own transaction with its own diligence; bundling it delays their residential proceeds.
  4. At $14.0M of cash-equivalent certainty from a credible, financeable buyer, they clear ~$488K/year of carry and their OREO exposure in one signature.

Bottom lineModel vs. recommendation

ModelRecommended
Opening bid$15.19M$14.0M
Walk-away / ceiling$15.99M$15.1M
Chauncey cap$7.1M$7.1M — unchanged
Plaza allocation$5.83M$5.0M ceiling / $4.5M open
Equity to budget$6.0M$11.5M+ (peak, mo. 13)
Base return at ceiling21.8% / 27.5%~24% / ~31%
Bear return at ceiling8.7% / 8.8%~10–11% unlevered

Before any further scenario work in the workbook itself: repoint the Unit Pools links from Revised Offer Case to Current Offer Case — otherwise the next sensitivity run will quietly lie to you.